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Abstract
Choosing between equally valued options is a common conundrum, for which classical decision theories predicted a
prolonged response time (RT). This contrasts with the notion that an optimal decision maker in a stable environment
should make fast and random choices, as the outcomes are indifferent. Here, we characterize the neurocognitive processes
underlying such voluntary decisions by integrating cognitive modelling of behavioral responses and EEG recordings in
a probabilistic reward task. Human participants performed binary choices between pairs of unambiguous cues associated
with identical reward probabilities at different levels. Higher reward probability accelerated RT, and participants chose one
cue faster and more frequent over the other at each probability level. The behavioral effects on RT persisted in simple
reactions to single cues. By using hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation for an accumulator model, we showed that the
probability and preference effects were independently associated with changes in the speed of evidence accumulation, but
not with visual encoding or motor execution latencies. Time-resolved MVPA of EEG-evoked responses identified significant
representations of reward certainty and preference as early as 120 ms after stimulus onset, with spatial relevance patterns
maximal in middle central and parietal electrodes. Furthermore, EEG-informed computational modelling showed that the
rate of change between N100 and P300 event-related potentials modulated accumulation rates on a trial-by-trial basis. Our
findings suggest that reward probability and spontaneous preference collectively shape voluntary decisions between equal
options, providing a mechanism to prevent indecision or random behavior.
Keywords Decision making · Reward probability · Preference · EEG · Cognitive modelling
Introduction
Cognitive flexibility enables decision strategies to adapt
to environmental and motivational needs (Schiebener and
Brand 2015). One characteristic of this ability is that harder
decisions often take longer. Evidence from neurophysiology
(Gold and Shadlen 2001), neuroimaging (Heekeren et al.
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2008), and modelling (Ratcliff and Smith 2004) suggest
an evidence accumulation process for decision-making:
information is accumulated over time, and a decision is
made when the accumulated evidence reached a threshold
(Gold and Shadlen 2007). This process can accommodate
paradigms consisting of noisy stimuli (perceptual choices),
as well as a rich variety of tasks with unambiguous stimuli
(value-based (Pisauro et al. 2017) or memory-based choices
(Ratcliff 1978)). For perceptual choices, evidence is derived
from the sensory properties of the stimuli; for value or
preference-based choices, it originates from internal value
evaluation and comparison (Krajbich et al. 2012); while for
memory-dependent choices, from sampling memory traces
(Ratcliff 1978; Shadlen and Shohamy 2016). According to
this framework, decision difficulty, and in turn response
time (RT), is proportional to the relative difference in the
evidence supporting each option, consistent with results
from perceptual (Ditterich et al. 2003), value-based (Polanı́a
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et al. 2014; Oud et al. 2016), and memory-based decisions
(Ratcliff and McKoon 2008).
Making difficult choices requires more evidence; hence,
longer deliberation can be an advantageous decision strat-
egy. Yet, scaling deliberation with difficulty is beneficial
only to a certain point. What happens if decision diffi-
culty reaches a tipping point with values of options being
indistinguishable? In the hypothetical paradox of Buridan’s
ass (van Inwagen 1989), a donkey which cannot choose
between two identical haystacks would, as a result of its
indecision, starve to death. This view is consistent with the
classical drift-diffusion model (DDM, Ratcliff and McKoon
2008), which encodes the relative difference of evidence
in favor of two options as a single accumulation process
between two absorbing boundaries. Such a model would
predict a deadlock or indecision between two equal alterna-
tives because there is zero difference in the mean evidence
supporting each choice (e.g., two identical haystacks), and
the decision process is dominated by noise accumulated
over time, resulting in prolonged RT (Teodorescu et al.
2016) (but see Ratcliff et al. (2018) for a recent model
modification that addresses this theoretical limitation).
On the other hand, economic analysis suggests that
choices between equal alternatives should be made as fast as
possible. The benefit of “rushing to decisions” comes from
being able to relocate our cognitive resources elsewhere
(Rustichini 2009). If evidence cannot bring us closer to a
better choice, deliberative thinking becomes an expensive
and unnecessary luxury. This effect can be modelled using
stochastic decision models with multiple accumulators,
each encoding the accumulated evidence in favor of one
choice, such as the Linear Ballistic Accumulator model
(Brown and Heathcote 2008) and the Leaky Competing
Accumulator model (Usher and McClelland 2001; Bogacz
et al. 2007). For those models, multiple accumulators
compete against each other on the basis of multiple sources
of evidence inputs, which by default eliminates the scenario
of indecision between equal alternatives.
In reality, individuals can make timely choices between
equally valued options. For example, in preference-based
decisions, it took under 2 s for one to choose between
two snack food stimuli that had similar valuations (Voigt
et al. 2019). In both humans and non-human primates,
higher reward magnitude facilitates RT in perceptual and
value-based decisions between equal choices (Pirrone et al.
2018). Intuitively, Buridan’s donkey would be motivated to
make faster decisions if the haystacks are fresh, compared
to when they are stale. This magnitude effect is in line
with ecological incentives: high rewards may imply a
resource-rich environment, for which one needs to exploit
as early as possible; low rewards may imply a resource-
poor environment in which it is worth waiting for a better
option (Pirrone et al. 2018). Furthermore, if choices are
based purely on expected rewards, one may choose any of
the equal-valued options with the same frequency, leading
to random behavior. Nevertheless, previous studies (Zhang
and Rowe 2015; Phillips et al. 2018) showed that in a
sequence of voluntary action decisions, humans deviated
from a random pattern of choice and exhibited low choice
entropy across trials. A similar conclusion has been reached
in consumer decisions, where brand loyalties are driven
by seemingly irrational preferences (Wheeler 1974). These
findings suggest a possible preference bias between equal
options, which renders some options more likely to be
chosen than others.
We focus on three issues that have been unresolved in
previous research on choices between equal alternatives.
First, we aim to explore the effect of reward probability
on RT. We expect that, similar to magnitude (Teodorescu
et al. 2016; Pirrone et al. 2018), higher reward probability
accelerates RTs. This prediction is not trivial, since
probability and magnitude can have different effects on
behavior. For example, Young et al. (2014) showed
that magnitude discounting follows a power law, while
probability is discounted hyperbolically. Unlike magnitude,
probability has an upper bound at 100%, which acts
in a qualitatively distinct way on behavior (Tversky
and Kahneman 1989). We expect this increase in speed
to be non-linear, with choices between two certain
(100% probability) options being disproportionately faster
compared to choices between two uncertain ones.
Second, in the evidence accumulation framework, both
the rate of the accumulation and the non-decision time can
influence a model’s prediction of reaction time, the former
encoding the strength of evidence and the latter reflecting
the latencies of visual encoding and motor execution.
During perceptual learning, the accumulation rate increases
along with behavioral improvements (Jia et al. 2018),
while the non-decision time remains unchanged in the late
stage of training (Zhang and Rowe 2014). Furthermore,
the accumulation rate is associated with the individual
differences in working memory (Schmiedek et al. 2007) and
attention (Nunez et al. 2017), while the non-decision time
is faster in individuals with higher diffusion MRI-derived
neurite density in the corticospinal tract, the primary motor
output pathway (Karahan et al. 2019). Recent research
showed that both parameters can be influenced by reward
magnitude (Wagner et al. 2020), and the current study will
examine further whether reward probability and preference
influence the two model parameters.
Third, we aim to describe the macroscopic pattern of
brain activities associated with differences in behavior:
it is temporal evolution and relation to model-derived
parameters. Functional imaging studies have localized the
mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic network to be involved in
both reward certainty and preference processing (Tobler
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et al. 2007; Abler et al. 2009), but little is known about
how these relate to global activations across the scalp.
Pinpointing when EEG activity diverges between conditions
and assessing whether these differences are transient or
sustained can further inform our computational model,
giving deeper insight into the cognitive underpinnings of the
decision process.
Here, we address these questions by combining advanced
computational modelling and EEG in a probabilistic
reward task. Participants memorized six unambiguous cues
associated with three levels of reward probability, a certain
reward level (i.e., 100%) and two levels of uncertain
reward probabilities (80% and 20%). Participants made two
alternative forced choices between cues with equal reward
probability (Fig. 1). The inclusion of the 100% reward
probability condition allowed us to investigate whether
cues with definitive rewards are processed in a different
manner than the uncertain cues (Esber and Haselgrove
2011). Additional task conditions involved binary decisions
between cues with different reward probability (unequal
trials) and unitary responses to single cues (single-option
trials). This design enabled us to focus on the neurocognitive
processes underlying choices between equal options, while
participants maintained a clear understanding of cue values
for rational decisions between unequal options.
We first examine how reward probability influences
behavior and whether a preference bias between equal
options is present. We then fit an accumulator model
of decision-making (Brown and Heathcote 2008) to the
behavioral performance across reward probability levels.
Posterior group parameters from hierarchical Bayesian
model fitting procedure were used to infer whether the
behavioral effects were driven by evidence accumulation
or non-decisional components of the process. EEG data
were analyzed with time-resolved multivariate pattern
classification for decoding spatiotemporal representations
of reward probability and preference. To establish a link
between the decision process and its EEG signatures,
we integrated behavioral and EEG data into a joint
hierarchical Bayesian model and tested the hypothesis that
electrophysiological activity reflects trial-by-trial changes
in the speed of evidence accumulation for decisions
(Twomey et al. 2015).
We demonstrate that reward probability and sponta-
neous preference independently shape RTs and choices
when deciding between equal alternatives. These behavioral
effects affect the decision process and evoke a distinct elec-
trophysiological pattern. Together, our findings contribute
to the understanding of how decision deadlocks between
two equally probable rewards can be overcome.
Materials andMethods
Participants
Twenty-three healthy participants were recruited from
Cardiff University School of Psychology participant panel
(20 females; age range 19–32, mean age 22.7 years; 22
right-handed). All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and none reported a history of neurological
































Fig. 1 a Experimental paradigm of the probabilistic reward task. Par-
ticipants were instructed to decide between two reward cues (equal
and unequal trials) or respond to a single cue (single-option trials).
b A total of six reward cues were randomly assigned to three levels
of reward probability (100%, 80%, or 20%). c Exemplar time course
of the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA) model for equal choices.
On each trial, the LBA assumes that evidence for two options are
accumulated linearly and independently over time in two accumula-
tors. The accumulation rate is sampled from a normal distribution with
mean v and standard deviation S. The starting point of the accumula-
tion process is sampled from a uniform distribution between 0 and A.
The accumulation process terminates once the accumulated evidence
first reaches a threshold B, and a corresponding decision is made by
the winning accumulator
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from all participants. The study was approved by the
Cardiff University School of Psychology Research Ethics
Committee.
Apparatus
The experiment was conducted in a dedicated EEG testing
room. A computer was used to control visual stimulus
delivery and record behavioral responses. Visual stimuli
were presented on a 24-inch LED monitor (ASUS VG248)
with a resolution of 1920 × 1080 pixels and a refresh
rate of 60 Hz, located approximately 100 cm in front of
participants. Participants’ responses were collected from a
response box (NATA technologies). The experiment was
written in Matlab (Mathworks; RRID: SCR 001622) and
used the Psychophysics Toolbox Version 3 extensions
(Kleiner et al. 2007).
Experimental Design
All participants performed a decision-making task with
probabilistic rewards during EEG recording (Fig. 1a).
Before the task, participants memorized 6 unambiguous
cues represented by different symbols and their associated
probabilities of receiving a reward (Fig. 1b; see Procedure).
All the cues had the same color (RGB = 246, 242, 92) on
a black background (100% contrast). Each cue was mapped
onto one of the three reward probability levels: high (a
reward probability of 100%, i.e., always rewarded), medium
(a reward probability of 80%), and low (a reward probability
of 20%); and hence, there were two different cues associated
with each reward probability.
Participants were instructed to maximize the total
accumulated reward in the decision-making task. The task
contained three types of trials: equal, unequal, and single
option. On an equal trial, two different cues with the same
reward probability appeared on the left and right sides of a
central fixation point (e.g., 100% vs. 100%, 80% vs. 80%, or
20% vs. 20%). On an unequal trial, two cues with different
reward probability levels appeared on both sides of the
central fixation point (e.g., 100% vs. 20%, 100% vs. 80%,
or 80% vs. 20%). On a single-option trial, one of the six
cues appeared on either the left or right side of the fixation
point. In equal and unequal trials, participants chose the left
or right cue via button presses with the right-hand index
and middle fingers. In single-option trials, participants
responded to which side the single cue was presented (i.e.,
left or right). In all trials, the reward was operationalized
as 10 virtual “game points” that did not have any tangible
value. The probability of receiving the reward in a trial
was either 100%, 80%, or 20%, which was determined
by the chosen cue. It is worth noting that, in equal trials,
participants’ decisions did not actually affect the probability
of receiving the reward because both options had equal
reward probability. In single-option trials, if participants
chose the wrong side with no cue presented (0.1% across
all single-option trials), no reward was given. Feedback for
rewarded (a “10 points” text message on the screen) or not
rewarded (blank screen) choices was given after each trial.
The total game points awarded were presented at the bottom
of the screen throughout the experiment.
Procedure
Each experimental session comprised 640 trials, which were
divided into 4 blocks of 160 trials. Participants took short
breaks between blocks and after every 40 trials within
a block. The mapping between the six reward cues and
three levels of reward probability was randomized across
participants. During breaks, the cues-reward mappings
were explicitly presented on the screen (Fig. 1b), and the
participants could take as much time as they needed to
memorize them. After the first two blocks, all the cues were
remapped to different reward probabilities. For example,
for the pair of two cues that were associated with 100%
reward probability in the first and second blocks, one of the
two cues would be associated with 80% reward probability
in the third and fourth blocks, and the other associated
with 20% reward probability. Participants were encouraged
to memorize the altered cue-probability associations prior
to the third block. This remapping procedure reduced the
potential bias associated with specific cues. No explicit
memory tests were performed.
Each block contained 64 equal trials (32 for 100% vs.
100%, 16 for 80% vs. 80%, and 16 for 20% vs. 20%); 64
unequal trials (32 for 80% vs. 20%, 16 for 100% vs. 80%,
and 16 for 100% vs. 20%) and 32 single-option trials (16
for 100%, 8 for 80%, and 8 for 20%) at a randomized order.
This design ensured the same number of trials with and
without cues with the highest reward probability (100%).
Note however that individual cues did not differ much in
terms of frequency of occurrence: each 100% cue appeared
56 times, compared to 48 for each non-certain cue. This
makes it unlikely that observed differences can be explained
by occurrence frequency alone. Because two cues were
bound to every probability level, different cue positions and
combinations can result in the same reward probability pair
(e.g., there are 4 possible combinations for 80% vs. 20%
unequal trials). These combinations were counterbalanced
across trials.
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation
point at the center of the screen for 500 ms. After the
fixation period, in the equal and unequal trials, two reward
cues appeared on the left and right sides of the screen
with a horizontal distance of 4.34◦ from the fixation
point. Both cues were vertically centered. In single-option
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trials, only one reward cue appeared on one side of the
screen, and the side of cue appearance was randomized
and counterbalanced across trials. Cues were presented
for a maximum of 2000 ms, during which participants
were instructed to make a left or right button press. The
cues disappeared as soon as a response was made, or the
maximum duration was reached. The reaction time (RT) on
each trial was measured from the cue onset to button press.
Reward feedback was given 200 ms after the reward cue
offset and lasted 800 ms, followed by a random intertrial
interval uniformly distributed between 1050 and 1150 ms.
As in our previous study (Zhang and Rowe 2014), if the
participant failed to respond within 2000 ms or responded
within 100 ms, no reward was given and a warning message
“Too slow” or “too fast” was presented for 1500 ms.
Behavioral Analysis
We excluded trials with RT faster than 200 ms (fast
guesses). For each participant, trials with RTs longer than
2.5 standard deviations from the mean RT were also
excluded from subsequent analysis. The discarded trials
accounted for 1.5% of all trials.
We first analyzed the proportion of choices in equal
trials to establish the existence of a preference bias. In the
equal condition, by definition, there was no “correct” or
“incorrect” response, since the cues had the same reward
probability. For each pair of cues with the same reward
probability, we defined the preferred cue as the one chosen
more frequently than the other (non-preferred) in equal
trials. The categorization of preferred and non-preferred
cues was estimated separately between the first two and the
last two blocks because of the cue-probability remapping
after the first two blocks. At each level of reward probability,
a preference bias was then quantified as the proportion of
trials where the preferred cue was chosen. The preference
bias had a lower bound of 50%, at which both cues were
chosen with equal frequency.
In the unequal condition, we defined decision accuracy
as the proportion of choosing the cue with higher reward
probability, separately for each combination of reward
probabilities (100% vs. 80%, 100% vs. 20%, and 80% vs.
20%). Two-tailed one-sample t tests compared the decision
accuracy in the unequal condition against a chance level of
50%, which would indicate irrational decisions (i.e., both
high and low reward cues were chosen in 50% of trials).
To determine how reward probability, preferences, and other
experimental factors influence RT, we analyzed single-trial RT
data with linear mixed-effects models (LMMs) using the lme4
package (Bates et al. 2015) in R (RRID: SCR 001905). The
LMM is a hierarchical regression method that distinguishes
between fixed and random effects Gueorguieva and Krystal
(2004). LMMs take into account all single-trial data without
averaging across trials and offer better control of type 1 and
type 2 errors than ANOVA (Baayen et al. 2008). Therefore,
statistical inferences from LMMs are robust to experimental
designs with unbalanced trials across conditions (Bagiella
et al. 2000), which is an important feature suitable for the
current study.
We designed two LMMs with different dependent
variables and factors (Table 1). Model 1 analyzed the RTs
from equal and single-option trials, including choice type
(equal or single-option), reward probability (high, medium
or low), cue remapping (before and after), preference
(whether the chosen cue was preferred), and right-side bias
(whether the chosen cue was on the right side of the screen)
as factors. Right-side bias was included to control for spatial
bias relating to preference for stimuli presented on the right
or left side of the screen. For the unequal condition, because
each trial had two cues with different levels of reward
probability that cannot be directly compared with equal or
single-option trials, the RTs were analyzed separately in
model 2. Here, we used similar predictors with exception of
probability, which was captured by two additional factors:
the sum and the absolute difference of the two reward
probabilities, as they both have been shown to affect choice
behavior (Thaler 1991; Ballard et al. 2017; Teodorescu et al.
2016).
In all the LMMs, fixed effects structures included
hypothesis-driven, design-relevant factors and their inter-
actions, and individual participants were included as the
source of random variance (random effect). We used
a standard data-driven approach to identify the random
effects structure justified by the experimental design, which
resulted in good generalization performance (Barr et al.
2013). This approach starts with the maximal random
effects structure (i.e., including all random slopes, intercepts
and interactions) and systematically simplified it until the
LMM reaches convergence. Table 1 lists the simplified ran-
dom effects structures. The correlation structures of each
fitted LMM were assessed to avoid overfitting (Matuschek
et al. 2017).
A Cognitive Model of Voluntary Decision-Making
We further analyzed the behavioral data using the Linear
Ballistic Accumulator (LBA) model (Brown and Heathcote
2008). LBA model is a simplified implementation of a large
family of sequential sampling models of decision-making
(Ratcliff and Smith 2004; Bogacz et al. 2006; Gold and
Shadlen 2007; Zhang 2012) which assumes an independent
accumulation process for each choice option. Our model-
based analysis has three stages. First, we fit a family of LBA
models with various model complexity to the behavioral
data of individual participants in equal trials. By identifying
the best-fitting model, we infer how reward probability
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Table 1 The linear mixed-effects models of RT
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent variables RT RT
Main effects Reward probability Sum of reward probability
Preference Difference of reward probability
Cue-remapping Preference
Choice (equal of single-option) Cue-remapping
Right-bias Right-bias
Interaction terms Probability * choice Sum of reward probability * preference
Probability * preference Difference of reward probability preference
Probability * cue-remapping Sum of reward probability * cue-remapping
Choice * preference Difference of reward probability * cue-remapping
Choice * cue-remapping Preference * cue-remapping
Preference * cue-remapping
Probability * choice * preference
Probability * choice * cue-remapping
Probability * cue-remapping * preference
Random effects Reward probability preference Sum of reward probability
(correlated slopes) Cue-remapping Difference of reward probability
and intercepts) Choice Preference
Right-bias Cue-remapping
Right-bias
Model 1 analyzed single-trial RT in equal and single-option trials. Model 2 analyzed single-trial RT in unequal trials. In both models, preference
was a predictor indicating whether the preferred cue was selected in each trial. Cue-remapping was a predictor indicating whether each trial was
before or after cure-probability remapping in the second half of each session. Right-bias indicated whether the cue on the right size of the screen
was chosen in each trial, modeling a possible response bias
and preference modulated subcomponents of the evidence
accumulation process during decision-making. Next, we
simulate the best-fitted LBA model and examine whether
model simulations are consistent with the experimental data
in single-option and unequal conditions. This is a stringent
test of model generalizability because the experimental
data in single-option and unequal trials are unseen by
the model-fitting procedure. Finally, we link the cognitive
processes identified by the LBA model to brain activities
by incorporating a trial-by-trial measure of EEG activity
regressors into the best-fitted model (Cavanagh et al. 2011;
Nunez et al. 2017, 2019).
The LBA model assumes that the decision of when and
which to choose is governed by a “horse race” competition
between two accumulators i ∈ {1, 2} that accumulate
evidence over time supporting the two choice options
(Fig. 1c). One accumulator is in favor of the preferred
cue and the other of the non-preferred cue. The activations
of the accumulators represent the accumulated evidence.
At the beginning of each trial, the initial activations of
the two accumulators are independently drawn from a
uniform distribution between 0 and A. The activation
of each accumulator then increases linearly over time,
and the speed of accumulation (i.e., accumulation rate)
varies as a Gaussian random variable with mean vi
and standard deviation Si across trials. The accumulation
process terminates when the activation of any accumulator
reaches a response threshold B (B > A) and the choice
corresponding to the winning accumulator is selected. The
model prediction of RT (measured in seconds) is the sum of
the duration of the accumulation process and a constant non-
decision time Ter , with the latter accounting for the latency
associated with other processes including stimulus encoding
and action execution (Brown and Heathcote 2008; Nunez
et al. 2019; Karahan et al. 2019).
Model Parameter Estimation andModel Selection
LBA model has five key parameters: mean v and standard
deviation S of the accumulation rate across trials, decision
threshold B, starting point variability A, and non-decision
time Ter . To accommodate the empirical data, one or
more model parameters need to vary between conditions.
We evaluated a total of 21 variants of the LBA model
with different parameter constraints (Fig. 3a). First, the
accumulation process may differ between the preferred
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and non-preferred options, leading v or S to vary between
accumulators (preferred, non-preferred). Second, reward
probability could modulate the accumulation process or
visuomotor latencies unrelated to decisions, leading to v, S
or Ter to vary between three levels of reward probability.
Third, the decision threshold B and starting point A
were fixed between conditions because the trial order was
randomized, and we do not expect the participants to
systematically vary their decision threshold before knowing
the cues to be presented (Ratcliff and Smith 2004). Fourth,
decision threshold B and starting point A were fixed across
preference levels, since participants could not predict which
cue would appear on which side of the screen. During
model-fitting, the decision threshold was fixed at 3 as the
scaling parameter (Brown and Heathcote 2008), and all
the other parameters allowed to vary between participants.
Theoretically, the scaling parameter can be set to an
arbitrary value, which does not influence the parameter
inference, as long as the priors of other parameters remain
realistic, but with some constraints parameter estimation
is easier to converge. Finally, because the participants
showed behavioral differences between reward probability
levels and between preferred/non-preferred choices, we
only estimated realistic models: those with at least one
parameter varied between reward probability levels (v, S, or
Ter ) and at least one parameter varied between accumulators
(v or S).
We use a hierarchical Bayesian model estimation
procedure to fit each LBA model variant to individual
participant’s choices (the proportion of preferred and non-
preferred choices) and RT distributions in equal trials.
The hierarchical model assumes that model parameters
at the individual-participant level are random samples
drawn from group-level parameter distributions. Given the
observed data, Bayesian model estimation uses Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to simultaneously
estimate posterior parameter distributions at both the group
level and the individual-participant level. The hierarchical
Bayesian approach has been shown to be more robust in
recovering model parameters than conventional maximum
likelihood estimation (Jahfari et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 2016).
For group-level parameters (v, S, A, and Ter ), similar
to previous studies (Annis et al. 2017), we used weakly
informed priors for their means E(.) and standard deviations
std(.):
E(v) ∼ N(2.5, 1), std(v) ∼ γ (1, 1),
E(S) ∼ N(1, 0.75), std(S) ∼ γ (1, 1),
E(A) ∼ N(2.5, 1), std(A) ∼ γ (1, 1),
E(Ter ) ∼ N(0.5, 0.2), std(A) ∼ γ (1, 1), (1)
where N represents a positive normal distribution (truncated
at 0) with parameterized mean and standard deviation, and
γ represents a gamma distribution with parameterized mean
and standard deviation.
We used the hBayesDM package (Ahn et al. 2017) in
R for the hierarchal implementation of the LBA model.
For each of the 21 model variants, we generated four
independent chains of 7500 samples from the joint posterior
distribution of the model parameters using Hamiltonian
Monte Carlo (HMC) sampling in Stan (Carpenter et al.
2017). HMC is an efficient method suitable for exploring
high-dimensional joint probability distributions (Betancourt
2017). The initial 2500 samples were discarded as burn-
in. To assess the convergence of the Markov chains, we
calculated Gelman-Rubin convergence diagnostic R̂ of each
model (Gelman et al. 1992) and used R̂ < 1.1 as a stringent
criterion of convergence (Annis et al. 2017). We compared
the fitted LBA model variants using Bayesian leave-one-out
information criterion (LOOIC). LOOIC evaluates the model
fit while considering model complexity, with lower values
of LOOIC indicating better out-of-sample model prediction
performance (Vehtari et al. 2017).
EEG Data Acquisition and Processing
EEG data were collected using a 32-channel Biosemi
ActiveTwo device (BioSemi, Amsterdam). Due to technical
issues, EEG data collection was not successful in two
participants; and therefore, all EEG data analyses were
performed on the remaining 21 participants. EEG electrodes
were positioned at standard scalp locations from the
International 10-20 system. Vertical and horizontal eye
movements were recorded using bipolar electrooculogram
(EOG) electrodes above and below the left eye as well as
from the outer canthi. Additional electrodes were placed on
the mastoid processes. EEG recordings (range DC-419 Hz;
sampling rate 2048 Hz) were referenced to linked electrodes
located midway between POz and PO3/PO4 respectively
and re-referenced off-line to linked mastoids. Additional
electrodes were placed on the mastoid processes. EEG
(range DC-419 Hz; sampling rate 2048 Hz) was collected
with respect to an active electrode (CMS, common mode
sense) and a passive electrode (DRL, driven right leg),
which were located midway between POz and PO3/PO4
respectively, to form a ground-like feedback loop.
EEG data were pre-processed using EEGLab toolbox
13.4.4b (Delorme and Makeig, 2004; RRID: SCR 007292)
in Matlab. The raw EEG data were high-pass filtered at 0.1
Hz, low-pass filtered at 100 Hz using Butterworth filters and
downsampled to 250 Hz. An additional 50-Hz notch filter
was used to remove main interference. We applied indepen-
dent component analysis (ICA) to decompose continuous
EEG data into 32 spatial components, using runica func-
tion from the EEGLab toolbox. Independent components
reflecting eye movement artifacts were identified by the
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linear correlation coefficients between the time courses of
independent components and vertical and horizontal EOG
recordings. Additional noise components were identified by
visual inspection of the components’ activities and scalp
topographies. Artifactual components were discarded, and
the remaining components were projected back to the data
space.
After artifact rejection using ICA, the EEG data were
low-pass filtered at 40 Hz and epoched from −400 to 1000
ms, time-locked to the onset of the stimulus (i.e., reward
cues) in each trial. Every epoch was baseline corrected by
subtracting the mean signal from −100 to 0 ms relative to
the onset of reward cues.
Multivariate Pattern Analysis
We use time-resolved Multi-Voxel Pattern Analysis
(MVPA) on pre-processed, stimulus-locked EEG data to
assess reward-specific and preference-specific informa-
tion throughout the time course of a trial. In contrast to
univariate ERP analysis, MVPA combines information rep-
resented across multiple electrodes, which has been shown
to be sensitive in decoding information representation from
multi-channel human electrophysiological data (Cichy et al.
2014; Dima et al. 2018).
We conduct three MVPA analyses to identify the latency
and spatial distribution of the EEG multivariate information.
The first to decode reward probability levels in equal
choices (e.g., equal trials with two 100% reward cues versus
equal trials with two 80% cues). The second to decode
preferred versus non-preferred choices in equal trials. The
third to decode between equal and single-option choices
with the same reward probability (e.g., equal trials with two
100% cues versus single-option trials with a 100% cue).
Each analysis is formed as one or multiple binary clas-
sification problems, and the data feature for classification
included EEG recordings from all 32 electrodes. In each
analysis, at each sampled time point (−400 to 1000 ms) and
for each participant, we train linear support vector machines
(SVM) (Garrett et al. 2003) using the 32-channel EEG data
and calculate the mean classification accuracy following a
stratified tenfold cross-validation procedure. In all MVPA,
we include the EEG data from 400 ms before cue onset
as a sanity check because one would not expect significant
classification before the onset of reward cues.
In each cross-validation, 90% of the data issued as a
training set, and the remaining 10% as a test set. In some
analysis (e.g., equal trials with 100% cues versus equal
trials with 80% cues), the number of samples belonging to
the two classes is unbalanced in the training set. We use
a data-driven over-sampling approach to generate synthetic
instances for the minor class until the two classes had
balanced samples (Zhang and Wang 2011). The synthetic
instances are generated from Gaussian distributions with
the same mean and variance as in the original minority
class data. Training set data were standardized with z-score
normalization to have a standard normal distribution for
each feature. The normalization parameters estimated from
the training set were then applied separately to the test
set to avoid overfitting. To reduce data dimensionality, we
perform principal component analysis to the training set
data and selected the number of components that explained
over 99% of the variance in the training set. The test
set data are projected to the same space with reduced
dimensions by applying the eigenvectors of the chosen
principal components. We then train SVM to distinguish
between the two classes (i.e., conditions) and evaluate the
classification accuracy using the test set data. The procedure
is repeated ten times with different training and test sets,
and the classification accuracies are averaged from the
tenfold cross-validation. We use the SVM implementation
in MATLAB Machine Learning and Statistics Toolbox. The
trade-off between errors of the SVM on training data and
margin maximization is set to 1.
To estimate the significance of the classification per-
formance, we use two-tailed one-sample t test to compare
classification accuracies across participants against the 50%
chance level. To account for the number of statistical tests
at multiple time points, we use cluster-based permutation
(Maris and Oostenveld 2007) to control the family-wise
error rate at the cluster level from 2000 permutations.
Estimation of Single-Trial ERP Components
We estimate two ERP components from single-trial EEG
data in equal trials: N100 and P300, which are subsequently
used to inform cognitive modelling. The visual N100 is
related to visual processing (Mangun and Hillyard 1991)
and the P300 is related to evidence accumulation during
decision making (Kelly and O’Connell 2013; Twomey et al.
2015).
To improve the signal-to-noise ratio of single-trial ERP
estimates, we use a procedure similar to previous studies
(Kayser and Tenke 2003; Parra et al. 2005; Nunez et al.
2019). For each participant, we first performed singular
value decomposition (SVD) to the grand averaged ERP data
across all trials from the same experimental condition. SVD
decomposes the trial-averaged ERP data Ak×p (where k is
a number of channels and p is a number of time points)
into independent principal components. Each component
consists of a time series of that component and a weighing
function of all channels, defining the spatial distribution
(or spatial filter) of that component. Because the ERP
waveform is the most dominant feature of the trial-averaged
ERP data, the time course of the first principal component
(i.e., the one that explains the most variance) represents a
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cleaned trial-average ERP waveform (Nunez et al. 2019),
and its weight vector provides an optimal spatial filter to
detect the ERP waveforms across EEG channels. We then
applied the spatial filter from the first principal component
as a channel weighting function to single-trial EEG data to
improve the signal-to-noise ratio.
The single-trial EEG data filtered with the SVD-based
weighting function is then used to identify the peak latency
and peak amplitude of the N100 and P300 components.
For N100, we search for the peak negative amplitude in a
window centered at the group-level N100 latency (112 ms)
and started at 60 ms. The lower bound of the search window
was determined by the evidence that the visual-onset latency
is 60 ms in V1 (Schmolesky et al. 1998). For P300, we
search for a peak positive amplitude in a window centered at
the group-level P300 latency (324 ms). For both N100 and
P300, the search window has a length of 104 ms, similar to
a previous study (Nunez et al. 2019).
EEG-Informed Cognitive Modelling
Recent studies showed that the variability of the P300 com-
ponent closely relates to the rate of evidence accumulation
during decision making (Twomey et al. 2015). We there-
fore extend the best-fitting LBA model with EEG-informed,
single-trial regressors, which estimates the effect of trial-by-
trial variability in EEG activity on the mean accumulation
rate (Hawkins et al. 2015; Nunez et al. 2017).
The main regressor of interest is the slope of change
between the N100 and P300 components, which is defined
as the ratio of the P300–N100 peak-amplitude difference
and the P300–N100 peak-latency difference in each equal
trial. We also test four additional regressors from individual
ERP components: P300 amplitude, P300 latency, N100
amplitude, and N100 latency. All the EEG regressors
are obtained from the estimations of single-trial ERP
components in equal-choice trials. To obtain a meaningful
intercept, the regressors are mean-centered and rescaled to
have a unit standard deviation.
Each EEG regressor is tested in a linear regression model,
using the same Bayesian hierarchal model estimation
procedure as in the behavioral modelling analyses. For each
regression model, we assume that the mean accumulation
rates of both accumulators v1(t) and v2(t) (i.e., the one in
favor of the preferred option and the other one in favor of the
non-preferred option) are influenced by the EEG regressor
of interest on a trial-by-trial basis:
v1(t) = ṽ1+β×EEG(t), v2(t) = ṽ2+β×EEG(t), (2)
where t = 1, 2, 3, . . . represents the equal-choice trials,
and ṽ1 and ṽ2 are the intercepts. The regression coefficient
β represents the effect of EEG regressor on the mean
accumulation rates.
The rationale of estimating an EEG regressor to the
mean drift rate is twofold. First, this approach allows
quantifying the trial-by-trial change over the intercept
(i.e., the mean drift rate), independent of its trial-by-trial
variability (parameter S). Second, one would not expect
the sensor-level EEG signal has sufficient spatial resolution
to distinguish between the two accumulators encoding two
options. Therefore, we estimated a single EEG regressor
across both accumulators.
Results
We examined the effects of reward probability and
spontaneous preference on behavior and EEG activity
during voluntary decisions. In a probabilistic reward task
(Fig. 1b), participants chose between two options with
the same reward probability (equal trials) at high (100%),
medium (80%), or low (20%) levels. In two control
conditions, participants made binary choices between
options with different levels of reward probability (unequal
trials) or responded to the location of a single reward
cue (single-option trials). Below, we first report behavioral
results. We then fit linear ballistic accumulator (LBA)
models (Fig. 1c) to the choices and RT distributions of equal
trials and infer about the underlying cognitive processes
based on best-fitting model parameters. Next, we perform
univariate and multivariate analyses of EEG data to identify
spatiotemporal representations of reward probability and
preference information as well as their time courses. We
then extend the best-fitted LBA model with single-trial
measures of EEG activity to test whether trial-to-trial




For each pair of cues with the same reward probability, we
defined the preferred cue as the one chosen more frequently
than the other (non-preferred) in the equal choice trials (see
“Behavioral Analysis” in “Methods”). We found a strong
preference bias (>50%) for choosing one reward cue over
the other at each level of reward probability (Fig. 2a; high:
95%CI [0.682, 0.765]; medium: 95%CI [0.679, 0.759];
low: 95%CI [0.669, 0.745]). A repeated-measures ANOVA
showed no significant difference in preference between
reward probability levels (F (2, 44) = 0.2, p = 0.81).
Therefore, although the two options were associated with
the same level of reward probability, participants did not
make their choices randomly. We further used a linear
















































































































































































































































































































Fig. 2 Behavioral results. a Preference bias across reward probability
levels in equal trials (top) and decision accuracy across reward proba-
bility levels in unequal trials (bottom). b Linear mixed-effects model
results for model 1 in Table 1. Dark red bars represent significant
effects with p < 0.001. Light red bars represent significant effects
with p < 0.05. Gray bars represent non-significant factors and interac-
tions. Error bars represent standard errors across participants. c Linear
mixed-effects model results for model 2 in Table 1. Significant effects
and interactions in RT from model 1 (Table 1) were presented sep-
arately for the following: reward probability and preference in equal
and single-option trials (d), before and after cue-remapping at different
reward probability levels (f), before and after cue-remapping in equal
and single-option trials (g). Significant main effects in model 2 were
presented in panel e. In panels d–g, error bars represent standard errors
across participants
bias as a function of cue remapping (i.e., before vs. after
the cue remapping halfway through each session) and
trial order in each testing block. The preference bias was
smaller after cue remapping (Supplementary Figure S1,
β = −0.181, 95%CI [−0.01, −0.348], p < 0.03), but was
not influenced by trial order (β = 0.037, 95%CI [−0.170,
0.243], p = 0.73). These results imply that, for a given
set of cue-probability associations, the extent of preference
bias did not significantly vary over time. Because the cue-
probability mapping was randomized across participants
and remapped within each session, the observed preference
bias is unlikely to be explained by a group-level preference
toward any specific cue, but rather a spontaneous preference
at the individual level. Additionally, to check if preference
from first half of the experiment affected preference after
remapping, we calculated the proportion of any cue being
preferred in both sessions on a subject level. We found
that preference was consistent only in 51.5% of cases,
rendering no support for preference transfer after remapping
(one-sided binomial-test p = 0.5, 95%CI = [0.361, 1]).
In unequal choice trials, as expected, the cues with higher
reward probability were chosen more often, as evidenced
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by the above-chance decision accuracies in all conditions
(Fig. 2a; high vs. medium: t (22) = 16.08, 95%CI [0.774,
1], p < 0.001; high vs. low: t (22) = 23.31, 95%CI
[0.862, 1], p < 0.001; medium vs. low: t (22) = 20.97,
95%CI [0.834, 1], p < 0.001; one-sample t test against
the 0.5 chance level). A repeated-measures ANOVA showed
significant differences in decision accuracy between reward
probability levels (F(2, 44) = 28.17, p < 0.001). Post
hoc pairwise comparison with Tukey’s correction indicated
that accuracy in the high vs. low probability condition
(93.8%) was significantly higher than in the high vs.
medium (84.3%) (t (44) = 5.267, p < 0.001) and the
medium vs. low (80.7%) (t (44) = 7.265, p < 0.001).
Similar to the analysis of preference, we used a LMM to
evaluate decision accuracy in unequal trials as a function
of cue remapping and trial order and found no significant
associations (Supplementary Figure S1, cue remapping:
β = 0.022, 95%CI [−0.235, 0.1901], p = 0.84; trial order:
β = 0.078, 95%CI [0.013, 0.169], p = 0.1). These results
suggested that participants memorized the cue-probability
associations for rational choice behavior and maintained the
decision accuracy throughout the experiment.
Response Times
We used a LMM to quantify the influence of experimental
factors on RTs in equal and single-option choices (Fig. 2b,
Model 1 in Table 1). The fixed effects included reward
probability, choice type (equal vs. single-option), preference
(choosing the preferred vs. the non-preferred option), cue
remapping, and their meaningful interactions (Fig. 2d–
f). Participants were faster when choosing the preferred
than the non-preferred option (Fig. 2d, β = −0.063,
95%CI [−0.027, −0.991], p < 0.05) and RTs decreased
as the reward probability increased (β = −0.101,
95%CI [−0.067, −0.135], p < 0.001). The RT in equal
choice trials was longer than that in single-option trials
(β = −0.292, 95%CI [−0.201, −0.384], p < 0.001).
The effect of reward probability on RT was stronger in
equal compared to single-option choices, supported by a
significant interaction between the two main effects (β =
0.045, 95%CI [0.025, 0.066], p < 0.001).
Participants had slower responses after memorizing a
new set of cue-probability associations, indicated by a
significant main effect in RT before and after cue remapping
(β = 0.149, 95%CI [0.096, 0.201], p < 0.001). The
significant interaction between cue remapping and reward
probability suggested that the increase in RT was more
pronounced in trials with lower reward probability (Fig. 2f,
β = −0.039, 95%CI [−0.051, −0.026], p < 0.001). The
interaction between cue remapping and choice type (Fig. 2g,
β = −0.247, 95%CI [−0.192, −0.302], p < 0.001)
indicated that this pattern was mainly associated with equal
trials. Because evaluating reward probability of a cue was
likely associated with additional cognitive load after cue
remapping, the observed RT difference before and after
cue remapping implies that participants evaluated both cues
throughout the experimental session.
In a second LMM, we analyzed RTs in unequal trials
(Model 2 in Table 1), including the sum and difference of the
reward probability of two cues in each trial as fixed effects.
The sum of two reward probabilities in unequal trials was
negatively associated with RT (Fig. 2e, β = −0.071, 95%CI
[−0.032, −0.110], p < 0.001), consistent with previous
studies that the total reward magnitude influences decision-
making (Pirrone et al. 2018; Teodorescu et al. 2016).
Additionally, the difference of two reward probabilities was
also a significant predictor at a more lenient threshold
(β = −0.028, 95%CI [−0.001, −0.055], p < 0.05). No
other effects or interactions reached significance, further
solidifying that the cue-probability associations were well
remembered in both halves of the experiment.
Cognitive Modelling of Behavioral Data
To identify the cognitive processes that led to the observed
behavioral differences, we compared 21 variants of the LBA
model. The model variants differed systematically in their
constraints on whether the rate of evidence accumulation
and non-decision time could change between reward
probability levels or preferred/non-preferred options. For
each model variant, we used hierarchal Bayesian modelling
with Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) parameter
estimation routine to estimate the posterior distributions
of the model parameters, given the observed choice and
RT distribution from individual participants (see “Model
Parameter Estimation and Model Selection”). To identify
the model with the best fit, we calculated the Bayesian
LOOIC score for each model (Vehtari et al. 2017).
MCMC chains representing posterior parameter esti-
mates in all the 21 model variants reached high levels
of convergence (Gelman-Rubin convergence diagnostic R̂
≤ 1.02 for all parameters in all models). The LOOIC
scores suggested that the models with the mean accumu-
lation rate varying between reward probability levels and
between preference levels fitted the data better than others
model variants. The best-fitting model (i.e., the one with
the lowest LOOIC score, Fig. 3a) had fixed group-level
non-decision time with the standard deviation of the accu-
mulation rate varying between reward probability levels
and preferred/non-preferred options. To evaluate the model
fit to the empirical data in equal trials, we calculate the
posterior prediction of the best-fitting model by averaging
100 iterations of model simulation using posterior parame-
ter estimates. Averaging across multiple iterations reduces
potential biases when sampling from posterior parameter
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Fig. 3 Model comparisons, model fits, and model simulations. a
LOOIC scores of 21 LBA model variants. The LOOIC score dif-
ferences between all models and the best model are plotted against
corresponding model structures, which were illustrated on the left of
the figure. The model structure specified how the mean accumulation
rate v, the standard deviation S of the accumulation rate, and the non-
decision time Ter could vary between conditions. A black-filled square
indicated that the corresponding parameter could vary between reward
probability levels and preferred/non-preferred options. An orange-
or purple-filled square indicated that the corresponding parameter
could only vary between reward probability levels or preferred/non-
preferred options, respectively. Unfilled (white) squares indicated that
the parameter remained fixed between conditions. Bar color indicates
whether the difference in LOOIC scores is considered substantial (over
10): white part of the bar corresponds to score up to 10, orange to the
amount exceeding 10. The best model was shown with a LOOIC score
difference of 0 (indicated by the red arrow). b Simulations of RTs in
equal choices, generated from the posterior distribution of the best-
fitted model for high (left), medium (middle), and low (right) reward
probability levels. Histograms represent experimental data and density
distributions represent model simulation from 100 iterations. Negative
values represent RTs for non-preferred choices. c Simulation of RTs
in single-option (left) and unequal (right) choices from 100 iterations.
Error bars represent standard errors across participants
estimates. Each of the 100 iterations generates simulated
behavioral responses (i.e., RTs and choices) of individual
participants, with the same number of trials per condition
as in the actual experiment. There was a good agreement
between the observed data and the model simulations across
reward probability levels and choice preferences (Fig. 3b).
We use Bayesian inference to analyze the posterior
distributions of group-level model parameters (Bayarri and
Berger 2004). To evaluate if a parameter varies substantially
between any two conditions, we calculate the proportion
of posterior samples in which the parameter value for one
condition was greater than the other. To test if a parameter
differs from a threshold value, we calculate the proportion
of the posteriors greater or smaller than the threshold. To
avoid confusion, we use p to refer to classical frequentist
p values, and Pp|D to refer to Bayesian inference results
based on the proportion of posteriors supporting the testing
hypothesis, given the observed data.
For the best-fitting model (Fig. 4a), we compared the
posterior estimates of the group-level parameters between
conditions (Fig. 4b and c). We found strong evidence for
choices with high reward probability to have higher mean
(v) and standard deviation (S) of the accumulation rate
than choices with medium (vhigh > vmedium : Pp|D =
0.999; Shigh > Smedium : Pp|D = 0.954) or low medium
(vhigh > vlow : Pp|D = 1; Shigh > Slow : Pp|D >
0.999) reward probability. The mean and standard deviation
of accumulation rates between choices with medium and
low reward probabilities were inconclusive (vmedium >
vlow : Pp|D = 0.839; Smedium > Slow : Pp|D = 0.877).
Furthermore, there was also strong evidence for a higher
mean accumulation rate for the preferred than the non-
preferred options (Pp|D = 0.999), and no evidence for
a difference in the standard deviation of the accumulation
rate (Pp|D = 0.532). These results supported the claim
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Fig. 4 Posterior model parameters and inferences. a Group-level LBA
model parameters of the best-fitting model: means of accumula-
tion rates (v, green), standard deviations of accumulation rates (S,
blue), non-decision time (Ter , orange) and starting point (A, purple).
Error bars represent standard deviations of posterior distributions of
parameter values. The means and standard deviations of accumula-
tion rates were shown separately for each reward probability level
(high, medium, and low) and accumulator (p1, preferred option; p0,
non-preferred option). b Differences of posterior parameter estimates
across probability levels (left and middle columns) and preference lev-
els (right column). The proportion of posterior difference distributions
above 0 suggested higher parameter values for higher probability level
or more preferred options
processed faster than non-preferred cues. Certain cues
were also associated with more variable accumulation rate.
Model comparisons further suggested that the latencies
of early visual encoding and motor execution were not
influenced by reward probability nor preference as the
models with varying non-decision time parameter did not fit
the data as well.
Next, we evaluated whether the best-fitting model could
reproduce qualitative RT patterns in the single-option and
unequal choices, which were unseen by the parameter
estimation procedure. This allows us to evaluate whether
the model that fits to the equal choice data can also
characterize behavioral patterns in other conditions. For
unequal choices, two accumulators representing two cues
with different reward probability levels compete to reach
the decision threshold, with their parameters set to the
posterior estimates from the fitted LBA model. For single-
option choices, a single accumulator is set to reach to
the decision threshold. Similar to the simulation of equal
choices, we average the predicted behavioral responses of
unequal and single-option choices for each participant from
100 iterations of simulation. Each iteration contains the
same number of trials as in the experiment.
For unequal trials, the simulated RT showed similar
patterns to the observed data, in which choosing between
medium and low probability cues led to the longest
RT (Fig. 3c). For single-option choices, similar to the
observed data, higher reward probability and preferred cues
were associated with faster RT in simulation. However,
simulated RT in single-option choices was longer than the
experimental data, suggesting that simple reactions to a
single cue may engage distinct cognitive processes beyond
the current model.
EEG Results
We focused our EEG analysis on equal trials (with
additional control analysis on EEG data from single-option
trials) because both reward probability and preference bias
played major roles in shaping the behavioral performance of
that condition.
Event-Related Potentials
We examine univariate differences in evoked responses
between conditions in single EEG electrodes. For each
participant, trial-averaged ERPs are calculated from epochs
of equal or single-option choices, with epochs time-locked
to reward cue onset. For both equal and single-option
conditions, we test for differences in ERPs between three
levels of reward probability using a one-way repeated-
measures ANOVA. Furthermore, we test for differences in
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ERPs between preferred and non-preferred choices in equal
trials using a paired t test. We perform statistical tests on
all electrodes and all time points. Cluster-based permutation
tests (2000 iterations with maximum statistics) are used to
correct for multiple comparisons across electrodes and time
points (Maris and Oostenveld 2007).
Different reward probability levels produced similar
grand-average ERP waveforms during equal (Fig. 5a) and
single-option (Fig. 5b) choices, with a negative peak in
the 100–150-ms time window (the N100 component) and
a positive peak in the 300–400-ms time window (the P300
component).
When assessing the effect of reward probability on ERPs,
we found no univariate differences survived the correction
for multiple comparisons in equal (p > 0.552 at all time
points, cluster-level permutation test across electrodes and
time points) or single-option trials (p > 0.175, cluster-level
permutation test). For equal trials, we found no significant





































Fig. 5 Grand-average stimulus-locked ERPs across all EEG elec-
trodes. a ERPs from high (100%), medium (80%), and low (20%)
reward probability in equal trials. b ERPs from high (100%), medium
(80%), and low (20%) reward probability in single-option trials. c
ERPs from equal trials in which the preferred or non-preferred cue was
chosen. In all panels, the dashed lines represent standard errors across
participants
choices (Fig. 5c, p > 0.208, cluster-level permutation test).
Therefore, in the current study, univariate ERPs were not
sensitive to reward probability or preferred/non-preferred
choices.
Multivariate Patterns in Equal Choices
To decode multivariate information representing reward
probability in equal choice trials, we applied the linear
SVM on multivariate EEG patterns across all electrodes
(see “Multivariate Pattern Analysis”). Binary classification
between high and medium reward probability was signifi-
cantly above chance (p < 0.01, cluster permutation cor-
rection, non-parametric Wilcoxon test) from 144 ms after
cue onset (Fig. 6a). Similarly, the information between high
and low reward probability was decodable above chance
from 192 ms after cue onset (p < 0.05, cluster permutation
correction). We found no significant classification accuracy
between medium and low reward probability (p > 0.16
in all time points, uncorrected). Therefore, choices associ-
ated with certain (100%) rewards were distinguishable from
those with uncertain reward probabilities.
We applied a similar classification procedure to decode
the information between equal trials in which the partici-
pants chose their preferred or non-preferred choices across
reward probability levels. The information about preferred
versus non-preferred choices was decodable from 316 to
472 ms after cue onset (p < 0.009, cluster permutation
correction).
To evaluate the relative importance of each feature
(i.e., EEG electrode) to the classification performance,
we calculated the weight vector of SVMs. For each
classification problem, we retrained the SVM at each
time point with all the data included in the training set
and obtained the SVM weight vector. The weight vectors
were then transformed into interpretable spatial patterns
by multiplying the data covariance matrix (Haufe et al.
2014). The group spatial patterns were calculated by
averaging across participants and from all time points which
had significant classification accuracy. Relevance spatial
patterns based on SVM’s weight vector showed that mid-
line central and posterior electrodes contained the most
information for significant classification (Fig. 6).
EEG-Informed Cognitive Modelling
P300 component is a strong candidate for a marker of
evidence accumulation. Its amplitude has been associated
with attention (Datta et al. 2007), working memory
(Kok 2001) and its amplitude with task difficulty (Kok
2001). Prominent models propose it reflects build-to-
threshold of the decision variable (Twomey et al. 2015;
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Fig. 6 MVPA results. a Classification accuracies across time points
between equal choices with different levels of reward probability.
b Classification accuracies across time points between equal trials
with preferred and non-preferred choices. c Classification accuracies
across time points between equal and single-option choices with the
same level of reward probability. In all panels, the black lines denote
classification accuracies from a stratified 10-fold cross-validation
and the gray areas denote standard errors. Significant decoding time
windows (green horizontal bars) were determined from cluster-level
permutation tests (p < 0.05, corrected). Topographic maps repre-
sent activation patterns from classification weights, which indicate
the contribution of different EEG channels to overall classification
accuracies
internal decision-making process (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2005).
Considering that the latency of early visual processing
is a part of non-decision time (Nunez et al. 2019), we
further hypothesized that the evidence accumulation process
initiates at N100 peak latency. This led to a theoretical
prediction that the slope of the rise in EEG activity between
N100 and P300 peak amplitudes reflected the accumulation
rate on a trial-by-trial basis. To validate this prediction,
we estimated the N100 and P300 components from single
trials of equal choices (Fig. 7a), using an SVD-based spatial
filter to improve the signal-to-noise ratio of single-trial
ERPs (see “Estimation of Single-Trial ERP Components”).
This single-trial EEG estimate was then added as a linear
regressor (1) of the mean accumulation rate to the LBA
model variant with the best fit to behavioral data (i.e., model
15 in Fig. 3a).
We used the same MCMC procedure to fit the extended
LBA model with the EEG-informed regressor to the
equal trial data. The extended LBA model showed good
convergence (R̂ ≤ 1.02 for all parameters) and provided
a better fit, with a lower LOOIC score 2687 than the
model without the EEG-informed regressor (LOOIC score
2796), suggesting that the rising slope of N100–P300 indeed
affected the decision process. The posterior estimate of
the regression coefficient β provided strong evidence for
a positive single-trial effect (Fig. 7b, Pp|D = 0.983),
indicating that a bigger N100–300 slope is associated with
a faster accumulation rate.
Additional Analyses: Alternative EEG Regressors
and Representations of Choice Types
Is it possible that a simpler EEG-based regressor based on
a single ERP component could provide a better model fit
than the N100–P300 slope? To test this possibility, we fitted
four additional extended LBA models with different single-
trial EEG regressors applied to the mean accumulation
rate: N100 peak latency, N100 peak amplitude, P300 peak
latency, and P300 peak latency. All the alternative regression
models showed inferior fits (LOOIC scores larger than
2700) than the N100–P300 slope model. We therefore
conclude the effects of single-trial EEG activity on the
accumulation rate were related to both ERP components.
We did not observe above-chance classification between
equal trials with the two levels of uncertain reward
probability (Fig. 6a). One may concern whether the lack
of significant classification was due to the small number
of trials in those conditions. To rule out this possibility,
we conducted binary classifications to discriminate equal
and single-option trials. The information about trial types
(equal vs. single-option) was decodable at every level of
reward probability (Fig. 6c, p < 0.05, cluster corrected),
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Fig. 7 EEG-informed modelling. a The schematic diagram of extract-
ing single-trial ERP components. 32-channel EEG signals from a
single trial were multiplied by the weights of the first SVD compo-
nent, calculated from the grand-averaged ERP. Next, the N100 and
P300 components in that trial were identified by searching for the
peak amplitude in a time of 60–164 ms for the N100 component,
and 272–376 ms for the P300 component, respectively. ERP marks
in three representative trials were illustrated in the right column of
the panel. The ratio between N100–P300 peak amplitude difference
and N100–P300 peak latency difference was calculated as a single-
trial regressor for modelling. b Posterior estimates of the coefficient
between the EEG-informed single-trial regressor (i.e., the rising slope
of N100-P300 components) and changes in the accumulation rate
including the one with the least number of trials (i.e., the
low reward probability). This result was expected, given
the large difference in stimulus presentation and behavioral
performance between the two types of choices. SVM-based
relevance patterns highlighted the middle central and frontal
electrodes to contain most of the information of trial types.
These results suggested that the difference in classification
accuracies between certain and uncertain reward conditions
could not be readily caused by differences in the number of
trials.
Discussion
We provide novel evidence that reward probability and
spontaneous preference influence choices between equally
probable alternatives and their electrophysiological signa-
tures. We observed two patterns that were consistently dis-
tinct at behavioral, cognitive, and neural levels: a certainty
effect, distinguishing choices between cues with 100%
reward probability and cues with uncertain reward probabil-
ities (80% or 20%), and a preference effect, differentiating
between equally valued options. At the behavioral level,
reward certainty (i.e., 100% reward vs. non 100% rewards)
resulted in disproportionally faster reaction times, while
preference biased both choice frequency and RT, resulting in
more frequent and faster responses for preferred cues. Using
hierarchal Bayesian implementation of a cognitive model,
we showed that reward certainty and preference bias were
associated with changes in the accumulation rate, a model-
derived parameter to account for the speed of evidence
accumulation during decision-making. At the electrophys-
iological level, the information of certainty and preference
could be reliably decoded from multivariate ERP patterns
early during decisions, but not from univariate EEG activi-
ties. The accumulation rate was further affected by the slope
of the rise in ERPs between the N100 and P300 components
on a trial-by-trial basis. Together, the current study provides
insight into neurocognitive mechanisms driving choices in
a deadlock situation, where there is no clear advantage in
choosing one option over the other.
The certainty effect implies a monotonic but nonlinear
relationship between reward probability and RT in equal
choices: the difference between certain (100%) and
uncertain (80% and 20%) rewards was greater than that
between the two uncertain conditions. This points to a
special status of the 100% reward certainty distinct from
lower reward probabilities, as the latter always carries
a non-zero risk of no reward. The salient representation
of the 100% reward certainty is further highlighted
by the lack of significant EEG pattern classification
between the two uncertain reward probabilities (i.e.,
80% vs. 20%, Fig. 6a). Here, the certainty effect in
rapid voluntary decisions resembles risk-averse behavior
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in economic decisions (Tversky and Kahneman 1989),
which overweighs outcomes with 100% certainty relative to
probable ones.
Interestingly, reward probability affected RTs across
all trial types. It persisted from equal choices to simple
reactions to cue locations in single-option trials (Fig. 2d).
In unequal choices, there was also a negative association
between RT and the sum of reward probability of the two
choices (Fig. 2e). Therefore, even though the reward was
not contingent upon RT in the current study, we observed
a general tendency of accelerating ones’ responses in the
presence of a more certain reward. These results are akin
to the effect of reward magnitude, which also demonstrates
a facilitating effect on RT (Schurman and Belcher 1974;
Chen and Kwak 2017). In non-human primates, the phasic
activation of dopamine neurons in the ventral midbrain has
similar response profiles to changes in reward probability
and magnitude (Fiorillo et al. 2003), suggesting a common
mesolimbic dopaminergic pathway underlying different
facets of reward processing that affect decision-making.
Bayesian model comparison identified specific effects
of reward probability on accumulation rates, highlighting
two possible cognitive origins of the certainty effect.
First, in equal choices, cues with 100% certain reward
resulted in larger mean accumulation rates than those with
uncertain reward probabilities (Fig. 4). Accumulation rate
has been linked to the allocation of attention on the task
(Schmiedek et al. 2007). Because reward plays a key role
in setting both voluntary (top-down) and stimulus-driven
(bottom-up) attentional priority (Libera and Chelazzi 2006;
Raymond and O’Brien 2009; Krebs et al. 2010; Won
and Leber 2016), high reward probability may boost the
attentional resources allocated to sensory processing for
more rapid decisions. Second, reward probability affected
the variability of accumulation rates across trials (Fig. 4).
Higher accumulation rate variability has been associated
with better-memorized items (Starns and Ratcliff 2014;
Osth et al. 2017; Tillman et al. 2017). It is possible
that stimuli associated with 100% certain reward were
memorized more strongly (Miendlarzewska et al. 2016), a
hypothesis to be confirmed in future studies.
Furthermore, MVPA of stimulus-locked ERPs showed
multivariate EEG patterns distinguishing between cues
with 100% certain reward and other uncertain reward
probabilities as early as 150 ms after stimulus onset (Fig 5a,
see also Thomas et al. (2013)), and model comparisons
found no evidence to support for non-decision time to vary
between reward probability levels (Fig. 3a). Considering
the average RT of 600 ∼ 900 ms in equal choices, our
results did not support the latency of post-decision motor
preparation, which constitutes a part of the non-decision
time (Karahan et al. 2019), to be the source of the certainty
effect. This result is consistent with the view that motor
action implementation is independent of the stimulus value
(Marshall et al. 2012). Instead, the certainty effect possibly
originates from evidence accumulation during the decision
process, as supported by the changes in the accumulation
rate.
When choosing between equally valued options, classical
evidence accumulation theories predict a deadlock scenario
with a prolonged decision process (Bogacz et al. 2006).
This was not supported by recent experimental findings
in value-based decisions (Pirrone et al. 2018; Teodorescu
et al. 2016), including the current study, in which equal
choices took no longer than unequal ones. Our behavioral,
modelling, and EEG analyses indicated a preference bias
which could effectively serve as a cognitive mechanism to
break the decision deadlock. Compared with non-preferred
options, preferred decisions facilitated RTs, were associated
with larger accumulation rates, and evoked distinct EEG
multivariate patterns. Here, we did not aim to provide
a mechanistic interpretation of preference (i.e., why or
how the preference bias originated). Instead, our results
demonstrated a consistent presence of preference bias
before and after cue-probability remapping, independently
across reward probabilities (Fig. 2a) and maintained in
single-option trials (Fig. 2d), which we considered a novel
finding in the literature of voluntary choice.
What can induce a preference bias? Because the cue-
probability association was initially randomized and later
changed within each session, and no differences in shape
preference were found, this bias was not due to stimulus
salience but established spontaneously (Voigt et al. 2019).
Multiple factors may contribute to the establishment of
preferred options. Preference might arise as a function of
early choices and outcome frequencies (Izuma et al. 2010;
Bakkour et al. 2018), which shape future beliefs or alter
the memory trace of certain cue-probability bindings. This
interpretation is consistent with an irrationality bias, which
favors previously rewarded stimuli, even when controlling
for their value (Scholl et al. 2015). Alternatively, some
cue-value associations might be remembered more reliably
due to a deliberate cognitive strategy of memory resource
allocation.
Our results provide little evidence to either support or
refute these hypotheses. However, memory strength alone
cannot explain the full set of results in the current study.
First, it is worth noting that the stimulus-reward mapping
was presented a total of 16 times throughout each session
(at the beginning of each block and after every 40 trials),
and participants took as much time as they needed before
the next set of trials. Second, the linear mixed-effect models
found significant effects of preference on RT only in
equal and single-option trials, but not in unequal trials
(Fig. 2). If we were to believe memorization of items
to be different between two cues of the same reward
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probability, we would expect this to be reflected also in
the unequal condition, which was not the case. Future
studies could validate these hypotheses by employing more
frequent cue-probability remapping throughout experiments
and controlling for memory effects. Furthermore, all trials
in the current studies were randomized and participants
did not have prior knowledge of upcoming stimuli. One
future extension would be to evaluate whether presenting
prior information of reward probability in an upcoming trial
would modulate boundary separation in voluntary decisions,
similar to the effect of prior bias on perceptual decisions
(Mulder et al. 2012).
The current study considered a simplified form of
decision, in which the amount of reward was fixed (i.e., 10
game points). In traditional value-based decisions assumed
by the prospect theory, a decision-maker needs to integrate
the value and probability of gain or loss to obtain an
expected utility for each option (Tversky and Kahneman
1992). Together, our results here and previous studies
(Wagner et al. 2020) provide converging evidence that both
reward value and probability can influence RT in equal
choices. This raises the intriguing possibility of our results
to be generalized to choices with the same expected utility
but the different combinatory of value and probability.
Interestingly, the multiattribute extension of the LBA model
(Trueblood et al. 2014) has been fitted to RTs from such
tasks (Cohen et al. 2017), suggesting that our modelling and
EEG approaches could also be extended to explore more
complex decision problems.
Our study highlights the advantages of EEG-informed
cognitive modelling to inform behavioral data. Hierarchical
Bayesian parameter estimation of the LBA model provides
a robust fit to an individual’s behavioral performance
with less experimental data needed than other model-
fitting methods (Vandekerckhove et al. 2011; Wiecki et al.
2013; Zhang et al. 2016). By integrating single-trial EEG
regressors with the cognitive model, we identified the
accumulation rate to be affected by the rate of EEG activity
changes between visual N100 and P300 components.
This result contributes to a growing literature of EEG
markers of evidence accumulation processes, including ERP
components (Twomey et al. 2015; Loughnane et al. 2016;
Nunez et al. 2017), readiness potential (Lui et al. 2018),
and oscillatory power (van Vugt et al. 2012). It further
consolidates the validity of evidence accumulation as a
common computational mechanism leading to voluntary
choices of rewarding stimuli (Summerfield and Tsetsos
2012; Afacan-Seref et al. 2018; Maoz et al. 2019), beyond
its common applications to perceptually difficult and
temporally extended paradigms.
The EEG-informed modelling builds upon the known
functional link between the P300 component and evidence
accumulation for decisions (Polich et al. 1996; Verleger
et al. 2005; Twomey et al. 2015). A new extension in the
current study was to consider the accumulation process
begins at the peak latency of the visual N100 component.
Theoretically, the delayed initiation of the decision process
accounts for information transmission time of 60 ∼
80 ms from the retina (Schmolesky et al. 1998). Single-
unit recording concurs with this pre-decision delay, as
neurons in putative evidence accumulation regions exhibit a
transient dip and recovery activity independent of decisions
approximately 90 ms after stimulus onset (Roitman and
Shadlen 2002). Practically, our EEG data has a clear N100
component, and time-resolved MVPA identified significant
pattern differentiating between task conditions at a similar
latency. The relatively early start of the accumulation
process in our experiment might be explained by the easily
discriminable nature of the cues, consisting of basic shapes
with no perceptual noise. Longer visual processing stage
has been reported in an experiment involving more complex
processing of visual information (Nunez et al. 2019).
Further research could dissect the non-decision time (White
et al. 2014; Tomassini et al. 2019) and compare latencies
of visual encoding across decision tasks with stimuli at
different levels of complexity.
Several issues require further consideration. First, our
cognitive modeling was not meant to reproduce all the
rich behavioral features in the data. To include sufficient
observations for model fitting, we combined the data before
and after cue-probability remapping. As a result, our model
did not account for behavioral changes related to cue
remapping. Future studies could employ a multi-session
design to investigate how learning new cue-probability
associations influences model parameters (Zhang and Rowe
2014).
Second, we focused on the certainty and preference
effects by fitting the LBA model only to the data from
equal choices. Although simulations indicated that the
fitted model provided similar behavioral patterns as in the
empirical data in unequal and single-option choices, it was
not fitted directly to the experiment data in those two choice
conditions. A more parsimonious model for all three types
of choices would require additional assumptions, which is
beyond the scope of the current study. For example, to
incorporate the large RT discrepancy between equal and
single-option choices, one could assume that the urgency
signal (Boehm et al. 2016; Thura and Cisek 2017) plays a
more dominant role in accelerating RT when no apparent
comparisons are needed in single-option choices.
Third, our model selection procedure does not encom-
pass all conceivable model types that might account for
this data. Independent accumulation is consistent with find-
ings on brain mechanisms of probability-based choices in
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humans (Kolling et al. 2014; Scholl et al. 2015), as well
as choice behavior in rats (Ojeda et al. 2018). Alterna-
tive explanations of certainty and preference effects can be
provided by urgency gating (Thura et al. 2012), collaps-
ing threshold (Ratcliff and Frank 2012), or cross-inhibition
(Pais et al. 2013; Usher and McClelland 2001). Depend-
ing on the parameterization, interpretations based on these
models could slightly vary. It is also important to note that
there may be no straightforward way to disentangle the
interpretations provided by these different models (Miletić
and van Maanen 2019). These potential differences how-
ever, although important, would not challenge the main
conclusions of this paper.
Finally, our model-based analysis is unavoidably con-
strained by the choice of model, and one needs to be
cautious when extending findings to different models. There
is an ongoing debate on how accurately different models
can mimic each other when estimating the non-decision
time (Donkin et al. 2011; Goldfarb et al. 2014; Lerche
and Voss 2018). The DDM, for example, tends to predict
longer non-decision times than LBA (Dutilh et al. 2019),
as well as might be more susceptible to urgency manip-
ulations (Evans 2020). Although an extended DDM has
been shown to account for magnitude effects (Ratcliff et al.
2018), the drift rate of a DDM represents the relative sig-
nal difference between the two options. As a result, without
fitting a new DDM to each condition, the DDM cannot
directly describe all conditions in our current study (i.e., the
unequal and single-option trials). LBA, on the other hand,
assumes an independent accumulator for each option (i.e.,
each reward cue), offering a parsimonious account to our
task and the capacity to produce the qualitative features of
responses in all conditions, as demonstrated in our model
simulations. It is worth noting that this feature of LBA is
shared by other models with multiple accumulators (e.g., the
LCA model and the race model). Among those, the LBA
model has the simplest form and analytic solutions to the
first-passage time, enabling efficient MCMC sampling in
Bayesian hierarchical modelling.
In conclusion, when choosing between equally proba-
ble reward outcomes, probability and preference selectively
modulate the decision processes and their electrophysio-
logical signatures, providing a mechanism for breaking a
decision deadlock. These findings extend and substantiate
the computational framework of evidence accumulation for
voluntary decisions. Our results further highlight the intri-
cate nature of human behavior, as susceptible to external
factors as well as endogenous heuristics.
Supplementary Information The online version contains supple-
mentary material available at (https://doi.org/10.1007/s42113-020-
00096-6)
Acknowledgments We thank Sabina Baltruschat for assisting in data
collection, and Craig Hedge and Petroc Sumner for comments.
Funding This study was supported by a European Research Council
starting grant (716321). WZ was supported by a PhD studentship from
Cardiff University School of Psychology. DK was supported by a
PhD studentship from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council (1982622).
Data Availability We have made the behavioral and EEG data open
access (DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.9989552).
Code Availability The scripts for behavioral modelling and EEG
analysis are open-source and freely available online (https://github.
com/ccbrain/voluntary-decision-eeg).
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as
long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate
if changes were made. The images or other third party material in
this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence,
unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material
is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your
intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://
creativecommonshorg/licenses/by/4.0/.
References
Abler, B., Herrnberger, B., Grön, G., Spitzer, M. (2009). From
uncertainty to reward: bold characteristics differentiate signaling
pathways. BMC Neuroscience, 10(1), 154.
Afacan-Seref, K., Steinemann, N.A., Blangero, A., Kelly, S.P. (2018).
Dynamic interplay of value and sensory information in high-speed
decision making. Current Biology, 28(5), 795–802.
Ahn, W.-Y., Haines, N., Zhang, L. (2017). Revealing neurocomputa-
tional mechanisms of reinforcement learning and decision-making
with the hbayesdm package. Computational Psychiatry, 1, 24–57.
Annis, J., Miller, B.J., Palmeri, T.J. (2017). Bayesian inference with
stan: a tutorial on adding custom distributions. Behavior Research
Methods, 49(3), 863–886.
Baayen, R.H., Davidson, D.J., Bates, D.M. (2008). Mixed-effects
modeling with crossed random effects for subjects and items.
Journal of Memory and Language, 59(4), 390–412.
Bagiella, E., Sloan, R.P., Heitjan, D.F. (2000). Mixed-effects models
in psychophysiology. Psychophysiology, 37(1), 13–20.
Bakkour, A., Zylberberg, A., Shadlen, M.N., Shohamy, D. (2018).
Value-based decisions involve sequential sampling from memory.
BioRxiv page 269290.
Ballard, I.C., Kim, B., Liatsis, A., Aydogan, G., Cohen, J.D.,
McClure, S.M. (2017). More is meaningful: the magnitude effect
in intertemporal choice depends on self-control. Psychological
Science, 28(10), 1443–1454.
Comput Brain Behav
Barr, D.J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., Tily, H.J. (2013). Random effects
structure for confirmatory hypothesis testing: keep it maximal.
Journal of Memory and Language, 68(3), 255–278.
Bates, D., Kliegl, R., Vasishth, S., Baayen, H. (2015). Parsimonious
mixed models. arXiv:1506.04967.
Bayarri, M.J., & Berger, J.O. (2004). The interplay of Bayesian and
frequentist analysis. Statistical Science, 19(1), 58–80.
Betancourt, M. (2017). A conceptual introduction to Hamiltonian
monte carlo. arXiv:1701.02434.
Boehm, U., Hawkins, G.E., Brown, S., van Rijn, H., Wagenmakers,
E.-J. (2016). Of monkeys and men: impatience in perceptual
decision-making. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(3), 738–
749.
Bogacz, R., Brown, E., Moehlis, J., Holmes, P., Cohen, J.D. (2006).
The physics of optimal decision making: a formal analysis of
models of performance in two-alternative forced-choice tasks.
Psychological Review, 113(4), 700.
Bogacz, R., Usher, M., Zhang, J., McClelland, J.L. (2007). Extend-
ing a biologically inspired model of choice: multi-alternatives,
nonlinearity and value-based multidimensional choice. Philosoph-
ical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences,
362(1485), 1655–1670.
Brown, S.D., & Heathcote, A. (2008). The simplest complete model
of choice response time: linear ballistic accumulation. Cognitive
Psychology, 57(3), 153–178.
Carpenter, B., Gelman, A., Hoffman, M.D., Lee, D., Goodrich, B.,
Betancourt, M., Brubaker, M., Guo, J., Li, P., Riddell, A. (2017).
Stan: a probabilistic programming language. Journal of Statistical
Software, 76, 1–32.
Cavanagh, J.F., Wiecki, T.V., Cohen, M.X., Figueroa, C.M., Samanta,
J., Sherman, S.J., Frank, M.J. (2011). Subthalamic nucleus stim-
ulation reverses mediofrontal influence over decision threshold.
Nature Neuroscience, 14(11), 1462.
Chen, X.-j., & Kwak, Y. (2017). What makes you go faster?: the effect
of reward on speeded action under risk. Frontiers in Psychology,
8, 1057.
Cichy, R.M., Pantazis, D., Oliva, A. (2014). Resolving human object
recognition in space and time. Nature Neuroscience, 17(3), 455.
Cohen, A.L., Kang, N., Leise, T.L. (2017). Multi-attribute, multi-
alternative models of choice: choice, reaction time, and process
tracing. Cognitive Psychology, 98, 45–72.
Datta, A., Cusack, R., Hawkins, K., Heutink, J., Rorden, C., Robertson,
I.H., Manly, T. (2007). The p300 as a marker of waning
attention and error propensity. Computational Intelligence and
Neuroscience, 2007, 93968.
Dima, D.C., Perry, G., Messaritaki, E., Zhang, J., Singh, K.D. (2018).
Spatiotemporal dynamics in human visual cortex rapidly encode
the emotional content of faces. Human Brain Mapping, 39(10),
3993–4006.
Ditterich, J., Mazurek, M.E., Shadlen, M.N. (2003). Microstimulation
of visual cortex affects the speed of perceptual decisions. Nature
Neuroscience, 6(8), 891–898.
Donkin, C., Brown, S., Heathcote, A., Wagenmakers, E.-J.
(2011). Diffusion versus linear ballistic accumulation: dif-
ferent models but the same conclusions about psychological
processes? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18(1), 61–69.
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-010-0022-4.
Dutilh, G., Annis, J., Brown, S.D., Cassey, P., Evans, N.J., Grasman,
R.P.P.P., Hawkins, G.E., Heathcote, A., Holmes, W.R., Krypotos,
A.-M., Kupitz, C.N., Leite, F.P., Lerche, V., Lin, Y.-S., Logan,
G.D., Palmeri, T.J., Starns, J.J., Trueblood, J.S., van Maanen,
L., van Ravenzwaaij, D., Vandekerckhove, J., Visser, I., Voss,
A., White, C.N., Wiecki, T.V., Rieskamp, J., Donkin, C.
(2019). The quality of response time data inference: a blinded,
collaborative assessment of the validity of cognitive models.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 26(4), 1051–1069. ISSN 1531-
5320. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-017-1417-2.
Esber, G.R., & Haselgrove, M. (2011). Reconciling the influence of
predictiveness and uncertainty on stimulus salience: a model of
attention in associative learning. Proceedings of the Royal Society
B: Biological Sciences, 278(1718), 2553–2561.
Evans, N. (2020). Think fast! the implications of emphasizing
urgency in decision-making. Psyarchiv. https://doi.org/10.31234/
osf.io/pfrb4.
Fiorillo, C.D., Tobler, P.N., Schultz, W. (2003). Discrete coding of
reward probability and uncertainty by dopamine neurons. Science,
299(5614), 1898–1902.
Garrett, D., Peterson, D.A., Anderson, C.W., Thaut, M.H.
(2003). Comparison of linear, nonlinear, and feature selection
methods for eeg signal classification. IEEE Transactions on
Neural Systems and Rehabilitation Engineering, 11(2), 141–
144.
Gelman, A., Rubin, D.B., et al. (1992). Inference from iterative
simulation using multiple sequences. Statistical Science, 7(4),
457–472.
Gold, J.I., & Shadlen, M.N. (2001). Neural computations that underlie
decisions about sensory stimuli. Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
5(1), 10–16.
Gold, J.I., & Shadlen, M.N. (2007). The neural basis of decision
making. Annual Review of Neuroscience 30.
Goldfarb, S., Leonard, N.E., Simen, P., Caicedo-Núñez, C.H., Holmes,
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